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ABSTRACT 
The goal in this article is to offer a vision for a scholarship of philosophical learning that 
philosophers find plausible and helpful and that utilizes our disciplinary skills and knowledge 
to produce useful insights into how students learn philosophy. Doing so is a challenge 
because philosophers typically and historically conceive of our work as being properly done in 
the proverbial armchair, that is, done without being tied to empirical data. To begin, I look at 
three common types of philosophy pedagogy research and I show ways that each can be 
done well and the limitations of each. Ultimately, I argue that, while useful and revealing in 
some ways, the techniques typically fail to illuminate where philosophy students are in 
learning the habits, dispositions and skills that are most typically associated with the 
discipline. Arguing that to understand students in these ways requires observation, and thus, 
non-armchair methods, I briefly explore the use of think alouds, arguing that they offer one 
viable path to a scholarship of learning in philosophy that would allow philosophers to both 
observe and to use our own disciplinary skills to make the thinking of our students visible in 
ways that will help us be clearer about how student and expert thinking differs so we can 
better determine how to help them improve. 
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I regularly attend both Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) and philosophy pedagogy 
conferences and typically leave frustrated because of what I see as methodological weaknesses that are 
common in both milieus. My primary purpose in this article is to focus on the philosophy pedagogy side, 
highlighting the possibilities and problems that typically exist in the disciplinary pedagogy literature and 
in the habits of philosophers as they practice and talk about teaching—and when they talk about 
pedagogy, they do overwhelmingly talk about teaching rather than talk about learning (Bloch-Schulman, 
2012)—and to offer a vision of how to move forward toward more student and student learning-
centered pedagogy research in philosophy. By focusing on these possibilities and problems in 
philosophy pedagogy, along the way I note (but do not explore in detail) a missed opportunity which 
hurts the overall project of SoTL.1 In more positive terms, I think that philosophy needs the student-
focus of SoTL and that SoTL would benefit greatly from some of the questioning critique and 
distinction-making that philosophers offer.  
After describing briefly in very general terms the way most philosophy is done within institutions 
of higher education, I articulate and critique three typical approaches to doing philosophy pedagogy 
research: 1. through the adoption and use of scientific and social scientific methods, 2. through the 
application of scientific and social scientific knowledge discovered outside of the philosophy classroom 
to philosophic settings, and, most popularly, 3. exclusively in the proverbial armchair. I do not take these 
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to be a hard-and-fast distinctions; much research is done blending these and, as I will show, work in the 
armchair shows up in unexpected ways throughout. I contend that each of these can be done well, and 
when done well, each has a value both for philosophy and its teaching, and also for the study of teaching 
and learning more broadly. I will also argue how each of these are limited and can, and often do, go 
wrong by ignoring the appropriate limits, costs of these limits, and the problems when they are not 
adhered to. In the end, I argue that all three fail to forefront a way of observing our students and thus fail 
to give us sufficient insight into their philosophic learning, and suggest a specific way that philosophers 
can adopt and adapt SoTL methods for the study of philosophic learning; specifically, I do this by 
arguing for, and showing an example of the use of, think alouds to highlight differences in reading 
practices of philosophy majors and professional philosophers.  
A caveat before I begin: I write from the context of philosophy within the United States of 
America, and speak about philosophy and its pedagogical research within this space. In addition, I am 
not interested here in theoretical arguments about what philosophy ought to be or what it is in theory; I 
take philosophy as it is practiced, specifically as it appears in our classrooms, as we, as philosophers, are 
trained to practice it through our teaching of it within the academy, and as we describe and enact it in 
our pedagogical research. I expect that the description will more easily fit some other contexts (e.g., 
other English-speaking, Western contexts, like Canada), and will fit less for philosophy and its 
pedagogical research done differently and in different contexts. 
PHILOSOPHY AS TRADITIONALLY DONE FROM THE ARMCHAIR 
It is impossible to talk in general terms about the current state of philosophical pedagogy in the 
US without giving a short, incredibly general context about philosophy as it is typically practiced within 
the US. Overwhelmingly, even across incredibly diverse areas of interest, commitment, and 
specialization, contemporary philosophy is done in, as Timothy Williamson describe it, the armchair. By 
that, he means that philosophy “consist[s] of thinking, without any special interaction with the world 
beyond the chair, such as measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve” 
(Williamson, 2007, p. 1). He explains the reason for this: “For good or for ill, few philosophers show 
much appetite for the risky business of making predictions and testing them against observation, 
whether or not their theories in fact have consequences that could be so tested” (Williamson, 2007, p. 
1). As I will show in the discussion of the three typical ways philosophers engage with teaching and 
learning, this vision of how philosophy ought be done casts a huge shadow over the way philosophy 
pedagogy is conducted and taken up, which I discuss in the following three sections. 
An example might help: in "Knowledge, Understanding and Pedagogy," James Digiovanna 
argues that we need to be clearer about what we mean when we claim that a student “knows” something, 
and that common ways of thinking about knowing are pedagogically insufficient (Digiovanna, 2014).2 In 
particular, he takes up the question of whether a quite common understanding of knowledge, that it is 
justified, true belief, meets our pedagogical needs. He argues through a thought experiment, by offering a 
case where we recognize a student having a justified, true belief who fails to achieve the kind of knowing 
we want our students to have. He starts by imagining a student who comes to have a justified, true belief 
that “Fermions have half-integral spin” (Digiovanna, 2014, p. 327). What is interesting about this 
justified, true belief, in this case, is that it is justified purely on the basis of appropriate authorities: this 
student’s instructor who is a renowned expert in the field and other highly reputable resources and 
experts all agree. The rub, though, is this: for this thought experiment, the student does not know what a 
fermion is, or what it would mean for a fermion to have a half-integral spin. Yet, the student still has, 
Digiovanna argues, a justified, true belief. He argues, and I suspect he is right, that as teachers, we think 
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this is insufficient; specifically, we would want a student to understand what fermions are, what “half-
integral spin” means, and what it means that fermions have such a quality. We can, as Digiovanna argues, 
thus imagine “incrementally increase[ing] the degree of understanding,” recognizing that the student 
can meet the threshold of knowing and not understand at all, can know and understand somewhat, or 
can know and understand at a high level (Digiovanna, 2014, p. 328). 
We see from Digiovanna’s work, two things. First, we see an example of an argument from the 
armchair; and, I would add, a compelling one at that. His method for arguing that we should not accept 
justified, true beliefs as our pedagogical understanding of knowledge is through thought experiment, and 
includes no necessary empirical claims. Second, his work shows something important that philosophy 
and philosophers do that would help SoTL more generally, namely, making finer distinctions that would 
help SoTL work be clearer and less equivocal. If we do not articulate clearly what meaning of “know” we 
are using (and why), we are likely to find some pedagogical techniques, for example, that lead to 
justified, true belief but not understanding, and others that lead to justified, true belief with 
understanding, and we might not see why some of these techniques are preferable to others. 
METHODS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PEDAGOGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Philosophy pedagogy research through the use of  scientif ic  methods 
Though, in my experience, it is still very rare, there is some, and recently there has been an 
increase in, the use of traditional scientific and social scientific methods in studying philosophy 
pedagogy. In one particular area, the use of scientific methods seems to me to have increased in 
philosophy pedagogy research in recent years. Specifically, there is an increasing and increasingly 
important use of social scientific methods in the study of inclusiveness—or lack thereof—in philosophy 
(within the profession, at graduate schools and for undergraduate programs). 
While I will not focus on this type of research more broadly, as it fits into existing paradigms 
within SoTL generally, I have three notes as it pertains to philosophy pedagogy research conducted 
using traditional social scientific methods: 1. When done well it can be quite useful; for philosophers, 
this typically means that it is used to study topics that admit of large-sample data analysis and that it is 
done by people who are trained to do such work. For almost all philosophers who might wish to produce 
research of this type, outside help is needed: they must rely on the expertise of the rare philosopher who 
is trained in these methods (e.g., Baron, Dougherty and Miller, 2015, relied on Baron’s expertise in this 
area) or collaborating with someone in another discipline entirely (e.g., Concepcion et al., forthcoming, 
relies on Messineo, a sociologist), to perform the analysis and make sense of the statistics. 2. Even when 
there is a philosopher who has statistical skills, there is still a crucial role for “work from the armchair,” as 
it is still necessary to think carefully and precisely about what the research takes as its guiding questions 
and how the research fits into the larger discussion of teaching and learning (Schouten, 2015). These 
are, no doubt, practices that scientists and social scientists engage in, as well. But they are armchair roles, 
nonetheless, and they are skills that philosophers are particularly trained for. It might be, in fact, that 
because philosophers do not typically spend any time learning other methods and are judged merely on 
armchair analyses, that they are particularly (though, of course, by no means, uniquely) well-suited to 
this do this type of work. 3. Though the numbers seem to be growing, it is still a very small minority of 
philosophers who are trained to do statistical anaylsis because armchair thinking remains such a 
powerful norm within philosophy. One important implication for philosophy pedagogy done using 
statistical anaysis is this: most philosophers are left without much insight in judging the quality of the 
work in the terms in which it was produced—that is, we can make sense of the conclusion, but are 
unable and unlikely to be in a position to judge the merits of the data and the analysis that justifies the 
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conclusion offered. Utilizing a method that is foreign to its readership makes it likely that the conclusion 
is acccepted without further examiniation of the argument and evidence that justified the conclusion 
(which, as the think alouds below will show, is odd for philosophers) or is rejected, dismissed or ignored 
out of hand, also without a full engagment in the research and evidence.3 Thus, if researchers are trying 
to do work that impacts teaching practices, work of this type is likely to play a small role (for at least the 
forseeable future). 
Philosophy research through the application of  scientif ic  f indings 
Another way that philosophy pedagogy utilizes scientific methods is through the application of 
findings in other disciplines (e.g., cognitive science, psychology) to the philosophy classroom. This is, in 
my experience, becoming more common, but is still fairly rare, especially at philosophy pedagogy 
conferences or presentations. As I will argue, the best research in philosophy pedagogy that applies what 
is learned elsewhere to philosophy is attentive to the research in other fields that is available, 
understands this research deeply, and judges wisely the insights from elsewhere that can best be adapted 
for use within philosophy classrooms. Ideally, this is not merely to connect research to learning 
simpliciter, as if learning in and across disciplines has the same goals, problems, and challenges. For 
example, if the discussion above about the typical “armchair” nature of philosophy distinguishes it from 
much—though as I argue, by no means all—empirical work, some pedagogical techniques that will be 
effective in a philosophy class will be quite different, in at least some important respects, than what 
works in other classrooms. I do not want to overstate the differences, though. As Galileo and Einstein 
sufficiently showed in the work they did from the armchair, armchair work can have unbelievable 
important impacts on even the most natural and “hard” sciences. And, as I will argue below, while 
application of general results to specific contexts is necessarily done in every discipline, it requires non-
empirical, non-scientific ways of thinking and judging. 
In addition, at its best, research through application of findings to novel contexts does not 
merely apply some general understanding of learning to “the philosophy” classroom, as if there is one 
site for the teaching of philosophy and one generic student population; rather, the best of this research 
recognizes that, as Alexandra Bradner articulates in her “Teaching Modernity in Appalachia,” any “class 
is a community primed in a particular way; and we ought to think about that when designing our syllabi, 
ordering texts, and writing assignments, even if it means straying from, neglecting, and, in the end, 
complicating the storied themes of modernity” (2008, 231) or other traditional conceptions of what we 
ought to teach and how. In other words, the best of this type of research is attentive to how it is, and 
often is not, relevant to the pedagogical needs of “specific groups of students” (Bradner, 2008, p. 235). 
One might ask, though: if the empirical research is, in this type of pedagogy research, done by 
applying the insights of social and natural scientists, how is this research philosophical at all? This type of 
applied research would seem, at first glance, indistinguishable from how those in social and natural 
sciences, or in professional programs, would apply general conceptions of learning to their own contexts. 
In her work on judgment, Hannah Arendt highlights the challenges with moving from the general to the 
concrete case,4 arguing that this move is always a move of judgment, not of knowledge, because there 
cannot be rules to determine how to apply the general to the particular. There cannot be rules to govern 
the application because, in the very least, those rules would themselves be in need of rules to determine 
when to apply them, which would themselves need rules to determine when to apply them, thus leading 
to an infinite need for rules (Arendt, 1978, p. 69 and 223 n. 3.). In our context, it follows that applying a 
finding from one context to another requires something that cannot itself be determined scientifically. 
For example, Plant et al.’s work on “deliberate practice” is based on certain kinds of activities, such as 
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learning how to play tennis (Plant, Ericsson, Hill, & Asberg, 2005). In terms of the classroom, unless the 
class is tennis, in every case, the analogy between tennis and the activity being taught will include some 
similarities (there is an attempt to learn something) and some differences (even if it is another sport, 
there will be different goals and different techniques to meet those goals). One will always have to ask: 
does the general fit here, for this task? As Arendt further noted, there is always a need to make judgments 
about the applicability of the general because something new is always possible (new students, new 
context, and even the instructor changes as a person through time); that is, it is always necessary to 
determine if the findings that were shown valid elsewhere, at a different time and in a different context, 
fit in always new (or potentially new) circumstances. Thus, Bradner’s admonishment is generalizable: it 
is not just teaching Modern Philosophy that needs to be re-thought in Appalachia, but there is always the 
need to think through and judge how the general fits in one’s own context. Making these determinations 
requires armchair work.  
In other words, what we need is not merely pedagogic knowledge—though we clearly do need 
that—but, also, pedagogic judgment. Furthermore, this pedagogic judgment cannot be reducible to 
something knowable; even as it ought rest on the knowable, it always, and by its very nature, exceeds the 
knowable. Thus, when philosophy pedagogy research that applies findings from other disciplines is done 
well, philosophers have studied widely in the scholarship of teaching and learning and have used their 
judgment, from the armchair, to find what is relevant and important to philosophy within that broad 
literature and offer insight into how philosophers might teach and how philosophy students might learn. 
A final note about philosophy pedagogy that works in the application mode: it only works for 
those cases and in those ways where philosophy is similar to other disciplines, and where philosophic 
teaching and learning are similar to the teaching and learning in other disciplines. Where it is, or might 
be different, applying principles from other disciplines will be of little help (or worse, will lead to errors). 
Philosophy pedagogy research from the armchair  
There are two largely distinct ways that philosophers have done philosophy pedagogy research 
from the armchair, and I will look at each separately. I will refer to the first as the unjustified armchair 
method (UAM), and the later I call here the justified armchair method (JAM).  
The unjustified armchair method  
By far the most common method that I have seen used by philosophers who engage in pedagogy 
research is what I am calling the “unjustified armchair method.” A typical case is Harry Brod’s work, 
“Euthyphro, Foucault, and Baseball: Teaching the Euthyphro” (2007). In this work, Brod offers an 
ingenious way to explain the central argument Socrates makes about piety in Euthyphro—where 
Socrates asks: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved by the 
gods?" Brod offers an analogy to the cause of a runner being “out” in baseball: is the runner “out” 
because the umpire says so, or does the umpire call the runner “out” because the runner was, for 
example, tagged while not touching one of the bases? (Brod, 2007). After describing the analogy in some 
detail as he describes it to his students, Brod writes: “It is now easy for students to understand the issue 
here, and also to see that it is essentially the same question Socrates is asking Euthyphro” (Brod, 2007, p. 
253). Brod is thus explaining one difficult concept by using an analogy to a different, supposedly more 
intuitive situation. But what Brod does not take into account is that he is attempting to make something 
complicated easier to understand by utilizing a quite complex method, one that is often hard for 
students: argument from analogy. For this to work, the student would have to be able to pick out the 
elements of both cases that are similar (that both are cases where there is an authority, a judgment of the 
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authority, and some state of the world that the authority is either making true or is reporting the truth of 
through that judgment), as well as the dissimilarities, which are too numerous to mention. Brod may 
well be right that, having articulated the analogy as he has (and, presumably, as the reader of the article 
would in their own classroom), students will see what, until that point, was incomprehensible. But the 
crux here is this: as is so often true of philosophy pedagogy research, Brod has offered no evidence at all 
that this approach actually makes the Platonic argument any clearer to students, which was the goal, 
either by giving evidence of his students’ improved learning or by applying empirical work done 
elsewhere to his classroom context to show that it is likely to be successful or why. That is, while it could 
be studied empirically, Brod has used only armchair methods in drawing his conclusion, and has not 
given the reader any evidence of its effectiveness other than his say-so. The concern here is not that 
Brod’s suggestion is a poor one—I have, in some contexts, used his argument in class, and often to great 
effect—or that the evidence he provides of its effectiveness is insufficient or weak; the concern is that 
that there is no evidence given, and it is clear that he does not believe any evidence is needed. 
In other words, in Brod’s article and other research like it, we see philosophers doing armchair 
work to make claims that are open to empirical study but are ungrounded empirically (either on their 
own, or through applying the empirical work of others). Michael Goldman, the then editor of Teaching 
Philosophy—the primary and most prestigious venue for the publication of philosophy pedagogy in the 
United States—wrote a review article that included a critical analysis of the state of philosophy pedagogy 
at the time, centered on the problems and prevalence of just this method of research (though he takes up 
different examples of it), describing the state of philosophy pedagogy research in the following way: 
Virtually all the essays [in the book under review] purport to offer techniques for improving 
teaching and/or learning but little is said either about what improvement consists in or how one 
measures it. Consequently little or no evidence (other than subjective reports) is provided to 
show that a recommended approach “works” (Goldman, 2005, p. 278).5 
I thus call Brod’s approach, what Goldman describes in his review article and what I describe 
elsewhere (Bloch-Schulman, 2012), as the UAM not because his work is bad or unhelpful, but because it 
uses (1) armchair work and (2) the hope that work from the armchair will seamlessly transfer to the real 
world, without specific evidence that it does or the belief that one needs to provide evidence that it does. 
I mean the term “unjustified” therefore literally: he has not offered justification for his central claim. The 
problem is so wide-spread that Goldman says this of the book he is reviewing: the articles contained 
therein “confirm what has become evident to me in my ten years as editor of this journal: that the 
scholarship of pedagogy, at least in philosophy… is rather primitive” (Goldman, 2005, p. 278).  
The question, here, is begged: why would philosophers not offer evidence that their proposed 
techniques work? I suspect they do not explore these questions because they believe that that they 
already know the answers to these questions about their students and about philosophic learning. Or, 
more accurately, they tend to act and research as if they know these things, whether they would claim 
they do or not. Talking with philosophers (and many other faculty) about their teaching in a variety of 
contexts, the refrain I hear most often goes something like this: “X worked for me.” The implication 
being that I teach how I was taught, because I was able to learn through this method, and thus my 
students will be able to learn through this method as well. Without saying as much, this answer implies 
that what was done and seems sufficient in one case is both optimal and generalizable across contexts 
and for different students. But there are serious reasons to doubt both. Just because a person feels like X 
worked well for them does not mean, if they have only experience with one X, that the X was the method 
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that worked better than other methods. And furthermore, this view misses the problem of 
generalizability, particularly problematic because of the gap in skill, interest, and habits between typical 
students and those who will end up in the professorate.  
As I argue elsewhere (Bloch-Schulman, forthcoming), I fear that Iris Marion Young is right 
when she claims that when “privileged people obey the injunction to put themselves in the position of 
others, they too often put themselves... in the positions they see the others. When privileged people put 
themselves in the position of those who are less privileged, the assumptions derived from their privilege 
often allow them unknowingly to misrepresent the other’s situation” (italics in the original, Young, 1997, 
p. 48). That is, we look at our students and fail to take seriously the differences between us and them, or,
more likely, between our projection of what we think we were like as a student and what they are actually
like. Thus, when Brod or others think their methods work, they are really proposing that they “would
have worked for them,” and, implying that “because they would have worked for them, they would work
for other students, too.” But most of our students are quite unlike both what we were like as
undergraduates, and even more unlike what we are like now, in many really important ways. What is
needed, as I show below, is a method for us to accurately understand our students and to see accurately
how they are different from us.
The justified armchair method 
Daryl Close’s Lennsen Prize winning article, “Fair Grades,” might be a paradigm example of a 
philosopher working in philosophical pedagogy purely from an armchair, and by that I mean that he 
addresses issues that do not admit of empirical investigation (Close, 2009). He is interested not in “what 
works,” to use Hutchings’ language (Hutchings, 2000), but in what ought to be; that is, he takes as his 
goal the articulation of what role grades ought to play, justifying his conclusion by setting out a guiding 
principle of fairness, and then arguing though thought experiments for the implications of this view of 
fairness for how we ought grade. For example, he uses the “the apocryphal professor who grades papers 
by throwing them down the stairs in order to rank them, A through F” (Close, 2009, p. 364) to show 
how grading ought not be based on chance, but rather on merit. He also looks at typical views of how we 
ought to grade and argues against them. For example, he argues against the view that grades (particularly 
attendance grades) should be used as a punishment. Those who hold this view might cite research that 
shows that students, in the whole, are likely to do better by attending class. Close argues that, while it 
may be true for many or most students, we can imagine a student who performs very well without having 
attended a class, and that it would be unfair to punish this student for not using the commonly used 
means (attendance) to arrive at the goal of the class (learning, that is) (Close, 2009, p. 365). 
While one might argue against the atomistic way Close describes the learner and their role 
within the classroom and in society, and while one might find his tone ungenerous, it is easy to 
appreciate in Close’s article a strong example of the kind of work that is clearly done by a philosopher, 
using typical philosophic methods, and in which those methods are appropriate for the intention he sets 
forth. It is not that he makes no empirical claims at all. Certainly he does, throughout. But rather, the 
empirical claims he uses he believes to be uncontroversial, and thus offers no justification for them. Even 
so, the real work he does, the source of the justification of his conclusion, is normative through and 
through. Agree with him or not, his work would strike philosophers as clearly identifiable as philosophy, 
fitting well within the norm of the style and method of argumentation. It is not a surprise, then, that “Fair 
Grades” has been taken up so vigorously by the philosophy community, including a detailed critique, in 
John Immerwahr’s, “The Case for Motivational Grading,” (2011), which itself was good enough for an 
honorable mention for the Lennsen Prize. 
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Summary of  the state of  philosophy pedagogy from the perspective of  
methods 
The above account of what philosophic methods are, generally, that is, armchair methods of 
analysis (conceptual, logical, textual) and how these armchair methods are used in philosophy pedagogy 
research shows ways that philosophers have sometimes eschewed, though often used—sometimes well, 
sometimes problematically—our disciplinary methods to advance our understanding of the institutional 
study of philosophy. Largely absent from all of these types of philosophical pedagogy research, however, 
is a close examination of what students can do, how they do it, and how they understand what we are 
asking them to do. That is, there is some, rare but important work on what Hutchings calls the “what is” 
question within philosophy, which is almost exclusively done as large-sample data analysis. There is also 
a linking of “what is” with what Hutchings calls the “what works” question in the application research, 
described above. But the philosophy pedagogy research that offers a close reading of “what is” is almost 
always using insights of “what is” from other disciplines, that is, it is based on non-disciplinary 
understandings of learning that are then applied to the philosophy classroom. Finally, in the third case, 
philosophy pedagogy from the armchair, there is no attempt to study “what really is” at all: in the UAM, 
there is an attempt to say “what works,” but without grounding that claim in empirical research, and in 
the JAM, there is an articulation of “what ought to be.” What I call for, then, is a close examination of 
“what is” in philosophy, upon which we could build “what works,” recognizing that some of “what is” 
(and thus “what works”) will be the same as it is in other disciplines, some will be similar, and some is 
likely to be quite different. If we are interested in learning and activating what increases learning, and 
learning is an increase in something (certain skills, habits, knowledge, dispositions) or a decrease in 
something (other skills, habits, knowledge, dispositions), we need to know where students are, what 
they know how to do, how they habitually behave and think, what they know, and what their 
dispositions are. That is, we need to know “what is.” 
Towards new methods:  using think alouds to understand philosophical  
thinking 
Here, I will advocate for a specific approach to understanding philosophical learning, namely, 
through the use of think alouds. The purpose of this method is to make thinking visible by having 
participants talk out loud, saying as much as they can of whatever they are thinking, as they are thinking 
it and while doing a specific task. Think alouds can be done while participants do just about any task. 
Because they are done in real time, rather than offered as a reflection on a task already completed, they 
often offer wonderful insight into the choices, starts, false-starts, reversals and changes students make as 
they perform a task.  
While originally developed by psychologists and used in other disciplines (notably, history and 
mathematics), for philosophers the advantages of using think alouds are multiple. Most importantly, 
having students and philosophers6 create a text that then can be analyzed as one would any other 
philosophy text allows us to utilize our skills, values, and habits of mind. I am arguing here that coming 
to understand student learning requires, at the very least, observing, and I recognize that think alouds are 
therefore not primarily an armchair method of study. Still, think alouds allow us to learn about 
philosophical thinking philosophically in two ways: first, in asking participants to do philosophical tasks, 
and second, in the method of interpretation. That is, we might ask questions about aspects of learning 
that are particularly philosophic (even if not unique to philosophy), like using armchair methods to 
make arguments about why something ought to be done or not done. We are also in a position to read 
and interpret the think aloud data philosophically, using our own styles and methods of interpretation. 
Bloch-Schulman, S., (2016). A critique of methods in the scholarship of teaching and learning in 
philosophy. Teaching & Learning Inquiry, 4(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.20343/teachlearninqu.4.1.10  
87 
A CRITIQUE OF METHODS IN SOTL IN PHILOSOPHY 
Ultimately, though, the proof of my claims is in the tasting, and the value and amenability of this 
approach for philosophers will be proven not a priori, but through use and analysis of think alouds. 
One important note: while the questions about what philosophy is, what it studies, and what its 
methods are have been, and remain, an area of ongoing controversy within the field, “essentially 
contested concepts,”7 I am examining philosophical thinking, and what I mean by that is the thinking 
done by those who are disciplinarily and socially recognized as philosophers as it appears in an 
institutional pedagogical context. This allows me to leave behind much of the internecine disagreements 
within the discipline about the nature of the discipline. It also means, interestingly, that traditional 
divisions (say, between Continental and Analytic philosophers) play no role in this analysis because, 
though there might be important differences in how these groups of philosophers think, these 
differences were not evident in the think alouds I conducted with philosophers trained in both. What 
was important, and quite striking, were ways that philosophers differed from students of philosophy, and 
it is to those differences that I now turn. 
Initially inspired by Sam Wineburg’s work and, in particular, his use of think alouds to gain 
insight into expert reading of history (Wineburg, 2001), I turned to think alouds to understand 
philosophical expertise. I have asked a variety of people to perform think alouds (high school students, 
college students, graduate students and faculty, both within and outside of philosophy). I will focus here 
on comparing data from the think alouds of senior philosophy majors and minors from the study (which 
included 4 majors, 3 minors in their last semester before graduation) with philosophy faculty. To give 
some context: the students are all from Elon University, a small-to-medium sized private coeducational, 
selective Master’s level university located in Elon, NC, where the majority of students are white, straight, 
cis, traditional aged, and from quite affluent homes. The faculty included two colleagues at Elon and one 
from Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana. 
For this study, I devised think alouds to examine schema differences between the reading 
practices of philosophers and students. In particular, I wanted to investigate whether students were 
reading philosophic work through a schema driven by plot, which is quite different from how 
philosophers read, seeing philosophy as argumentation, and thus that students might be utilizing the 
reading skills they would correctly use reading fiction when reading philosophy, and missing the purpose 
and structure of philosophical writing (on schema theory, see Widmayer, n.d. and Armbruster, 1986). 
I therefore set up the think alouds to gain greater insight into the ways students understood 
different types of writing by giving them narrative writing paired with more clearly argumentative writing 
to see if there were significant differences between the way philosophy students and philosophers 
approached these distinct genres. I also wanted to hear students reason out a moral argument (that is, to 
do some classical armchair philosophy). To set up these various tasks, I turned to Simon Wiesenthal’s 
The Sunflower, because it offered everything I needed: a powerful narrative which culminates in a 
provocative ethical question about the narrative and, at the end, others’ arguments about how to answer 
that same ethical question (Wiesenthal, 1998). The narrative text recounted the story Wiesenthal tells of 
how, as a concentration camp prisoner, he was taken to a hospital for his work assignment where he was 
asked by a nurse if he was Jewish; when he said he was, he was asked by the nurse to follow him; he was 
brought upstairs to a room with a dying Nazi solder who told Wiesenthal his own story and, on his 
deathbed, asked Wiesenthal to forgive him, for all the Jewish people, for his role in the atrocities 
perpetrated against the Jews. Wiesenthal said nothing in response and left the room.  
I rewrote the story in very brief form (about 1000 words), ending the narrative with a modified 
version of the question Wiesenthal asks at the conclusion of the book (asking: “At the conclusion of the 
book, Wiesenthal asks the reader simply enough if he did the right thing. Did he?”); and followed 
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Wiesenthal’s narrative with a very short argument in response to Wiesenthal from Roger Kamenetz 
(Kamenetz, 1998). Participants thought aloud while reading the narrative, while answering the “did he 
do the right thing?” question, and while reading Kamentz’s own answer to that question. 
It is also important to keep in mind the context in which the students and faculty performed the 
think alouds.8 I was the one conducting them, there was a consent form for them to fill out, and as 
participants did their think aloud, I videotaped them. There was, thus, little natural or normal about the 
context in which these took place. It seems likely, therefore, that students (and faculty) would be trying 
to play to what they expected my expectations would be of their “performance.” 
In this article, I will focus on the think alouds of one undergraduate, Matthew Monito, a 
philosophy major then preparing to graduate, and Ann Cahill, my colleague in the Elon philosophy 
department.9 I have chosen to focus on these two participants, in particular, because neither are experts 
on the Holocaust, so there is no difference in content knowledge in the strict sense, and because they 
offer particularly clear examples for the case I am trying to make, though the same conclusions can be 
found throughout the comparison between philosophy students and philosophers. I begin with a short 
comparative excerpt from Monito and Cahill. In this excerpt, the text they are doing their think aloud 
about, which is the same for both, appears in bold text. 
MONITO THINK ALOUD 
Q: Anything that you’re thinking we want out loud. 
A: O.K. 
Alright… ““T his  is  an  abbreviated  vers ion 
of  a  true  story  or ig inal ly  recounted by  
Sim on W iesen…  W iesen… .”  I can’t 
pronounce that. 
“… in his  book T he Sunf low er .)”  
“Sim on,  a  Jew  w ho w as  captured try ing  to  
escape N azi  persecution of  the  Jew s,  i s  
p laced in  a  concentrat ion cam p though he  
had com m itted  no cr im e.  H e is  horr ib ly  
CAHILL THINK ALOUD 
Q: Any questions before we start? 
A: The only question is that I am in a different 
situation depending on what I’m reading. For 
example if I’m doing research I wouldn’t even sit 
down to read something until I had thought 
through what problem I am working on. So I come 
to it with a lot as opposed to scanning the 
newspaper or something like that. It’s not a 
universal position when I’m sitting down to 
reading. We’ll see what I do when I read this. 
 “T his  is  an  abbreviated  vers ion of  a  t rue  
story  or ig inal ly  recounted by  Sim on 
W iesenthal  in  h is  book T he Sunf low er .)”  
C l i ck  h e r e  t o  w a t c h  t h e  v i d e o  o f  M o n i t o ' s  
th i n k  a l o u d .  
C l i ck  h e r e  t o  w a t c h  t h e  v i d e o  o f  C a h i l l ' s  t h i n k  
a l o u d .  
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t reated,  underfed,  overw orked and in  fear  
for  h is  l i fe .”  Interesting… underfed and 
overworked. I’ve read those in other stories, in 
other true stories. Similar true stories. I find it 
interesting those are put right next to each other 
and… but I think it is good because it really 
emphasizes the, um, lack of health. You’ve got the 
no food so you are not going to get stronger and 
overworked so you are constantly getting weaker.  
So the first thing I notice is that there’s a 
parenthesis that’s lonely so maybe they meant 
there to be a parenthesis in the beginning of the 
sentence.  
“A bbreviated  vers ion.”  So that makes me 
think, I wonder who did the abbreviations. I 
wonder what’s missing. For what purpose was it 
abbreviated? Was there anything that was 
important that was missed out? I wonder if I can 
get my hands on the whole version of the story.  
“V ers ion of  a  t rue  story .”  I stop there and 
think wow, there’s been a lot of controversy about 
memoirs and what constitutes the true stories. It’s a 
first person narrative. Who says it’s true? Does he 
say it’s true and in what ways is it true?  
“S im on W iesenthal”… I know that name but I 
don’t think I’ve ever read anything by him so I’m 
not thinking if I had known something about the 
author I’d probably have stopped there in some 
ways and try to remember what I had read and 
what I thought about what I read and what context 
I had read it. I have no specific associations 
although again I recognize the name. The book 
The Sunflower I have no associations with that at 
all. So I think this is something completely new. I 
am thinking – my vague associations with Simon 
Wiesenthal are about something about the 
Holocaust and World War II. I can’t remember. 
Maybe I’m only 75% accurate about that so I’m 
wondering about that or if I’m confused him with 
something or someone else. 
Okay, so “Sim on,  a  Jew  w ho is  captured 
try ing  to  escape  the  N azi  persecution of  
Jew s  is  p laced in  a  concentrat ion ca m p 
though he  had com m itted  no cr im e.”  I 
would stop there and say that’s kind of interesting 
phrasing actually. “T hough he  com m itted  no 
cr im e.”  I never think of people in concentration 
camps as actually having committed any crime. Or 
if I had thought about them as criminals they 
would be artificial criminals in that they had broken 
some very unjust laws. That sentence stops me 
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because it somewhat contradicts all my—not all 
but many of my assumptions about why people 
were placed in concentration camps. I assume 
people were placed in concentration camps 
because of identity. Perhaps because of so called 
subversive activity, which I would not see as 
criminal. So that stops me. 
“H e is  horr ib ly  treated,  underfed,  
overw orked and in  fear  for  h is  l i fe .”  
Nothing about the negative connotations of those 
two first sentences stops me at all because it’s like 
yeah—concentration camps, of course. That’s not 
a playground. So that doesn’t stop me in my 
thinking.  
Before talking about the differences, I want to start by highlighting Monito’s attention to the 
particular way the passage was written, specifically, as he recognizes, from the perspective of Wiesenthal, 
the detrimental effects of being both overworked and underfed. While the text does not specify the 
relationship between the two, Monito is sensitive to how the two interact and reveals one essential 
element to the terror of this regime. This is all the more impressive, on Monito’s part, because it is, as he 
notes, typical and is thus easy to overlook. One can thereby see Monito’s sensitivity to the circumstances 
Weisenthal endures here. Monito does many other things well, too, including relating the new story to 
his prior understanding of the events of the Holocaust and showing a deep concern for the importance 
of forgiveness and its role in overcoming atrocities. 
What is, perhaps, most noteworthy in thinking about the differences between how philosophy 
faculty and students read, as exemplified above, is found in the role of questions. Cahill is not just asking 
many more questions—which she clearly is—but what emerges from her (and from other philosopher’s 
think alouds) is a much more skeptical stance, putting into question not just the motives and actions 
reported in the story, but putting the narrative itself into question. Students, on the other hand, ask some 
questions to make sense of the motives and actions of those within the story, but are powerfully 
credulous of the narrative, as written, so much so, that they remained credulous even when I altered the 
text in some cases to include errors, which the students largely overlooked and ignored. Philosophers 
not only read the narrative more skeptically, wanting to know not just about what happens within the 
story, but as we see in the Cahill think aloud here, also questioning why and how it was written, what role 
the writing is playing, and what purpose it serves as a written text. That is, students took the story as 
describing events that had taken place, whereas philosophers saw the writing of it as performative, asking 
about how, and for whom, and to what effect the performance was being enacted. In other words, the 
philosophers saw the text as doing something other than mere reporting (on the distinction between 
descriptive and performative utterances, see Austin, 1962, pp. 1-11). 
In addition to putting the text into question, philosophers expressed skepticism of the final 
question, the “did he do the right thing?” that comes at the end of the story. In fact, of the three 
philosophers who do think alouds, not a single one answered the question as it was given, choosing 
instead to question the question, offering alternative questions, or suggesting alternative methods to 
answer the question (e.g., I would want to discuss this with others). Cahill starts her response by 
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questioning the premise of the question, saying “Well, it 
begs the question of whether he was capable of doing the 
right thing. To me, a more interesting question: Is he in a 
position?—it seems to me, I think that’s an easier 
question to answer.” After arguing that he was not 
blameworthy (rather than answering whether he did the 
right thing), she ends her response to the final question 
by explicitly saying, “I’m not sure I like the question.” 
Cahill and the other philosophers thus did not only see 
the text and its writing as a performance, they also saw the 
think aloud process itself as performative, and as something 
itself to be put into question.  
For Cahill and the other philosophers, the text as a whole is under investigation, is something to 
be taken with a grain (or more) of salt. Wineburg argues that unlike in the “medical model of reading,” 
where readers stop and pay attention only when they perceive something to be going wrong, experts see 
the text, as a whole, “as a social instrument skillfully [or not so skillfully] crafted to achieve a social end” 
(Wineburg, 2001, p. 69). That is, unlike for these students, who read as if problems in the text are 
exceptions, as we see even in the short excerpt from Cahill quoted above, there is little unproblematic, 
little that does not call for close attention and critical engagement.10 
My point is that we in philosophy should focus on how our students’ approach to the texts and 
tasks, as revealed in the think alouds (and in the difference between their responses and those of 
philosophers) can and ought to inform the goals we set in our teaching and the agenda we set in our 
pedagogical research. Given that philosophers do consistently critique the text and tasks we are given, 
question the text and even question the prompt, ought not we articulate to our students why and take as 
a goal teaching students these habits, skills and dispositions? The need to teach these skills is highlighted 
in findings from Wieman and Perkins in the context of teaching physics. Specifically, these authors 
define the goal of “effective physics instruction” to be “instruction that changes the way students think 
about physics and physics problem solving and causes them to think more like experts” (Wieman & 
Perkins, 2005, p. 36). They describe research they have conducted based on “extensive interviews and 
well-tested surveys” which examine how well students’ are, or are not, changed by taking physics classes. 
Their findings are that, after taking a class, “students, on average, are found to be less expert-like in their 
thinking than before” (Wieman & Perkins, 2005, p. 37). Specifically, they reveal how students, post-
course, are more likely to hold that physics is “less connected to the real world, less interesting, and more 
as something to be memorized without understanding,” (Wieman & Perkins, 2005, p. 37).11 They 
additionally found this to be true even of classes that are successful in imparting content and in classes in 
other disciplines (they mention, specifically, chemistry [Wieman & Perkins, 2005, 37]).  
Juxtaposing Wieman and Perkins’s research with the think aloud findings articulated above, 
what becomes clear is that we, in philosophy, want to train students to question and question deeply, 
and yet, there is a good chance that our methods—if the analogy holds between philosophy and these 
other subjects—are likely to encourage content memorization without understanding and without 
questioning. This would seem intuitively most likely to be a problem in those philosophy classes where 
“content” is seen as most important, for example, in many introductory, survey and history of philosophy 
courses, though the task of faculty-directed assignments might itself habituate students to simply answer 
all questions, rather than to ask questions of their own and to question the questions they are given. The 
way students approach questions and their role in philosophy is under-studied and might reveal 
C l i ck  h e r e  t o  w a t c h  C a h i l l  a n s w e r  t h e
c o n c l u d i n g  q u e s t i o n .
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opportunities and challenges throughout philosophy instruction. What is clear is that philosophers act, 
in this regard, quite different from how students act and likely want students to act more like they do; it 
is also clear that philosophical research in teaching, as described above, largely ignores the skills, habits 
and dispositions of good philosophic question-asking and question-askers. In this way, focusing on the 
“what is” question through the think alouds reveals a significant lacuna in what we focus on as 
philosophers and what we focus on in our research intended to help students become more expert-like. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 This work was supported by an Elon Center for the Advancement of Teaching Scholars grant 
and by the Carnegie Academy for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning Institute. I would also like 
to thank the others who have worked on this special section, Susan Conkling, Sherry Lee Linkon, Karen 
Manarin, Kathleen Perkins and Nancy Chick as well as Peter Felten and the help from Elon’s Center for 
Engaged Learning for his and their support. 
Stephen Bloch-Schulman, Associate Professor of Philosophy, works at the intersection of political theory and the scholarship of 
teaching and learning. 
NOTES 
1. In my experience, for example, at meetings of the International Society for the Scholarship of Teaching
and Learning, the norms at the concurrent sessions and the way SoTL is described and engaged by the
plenary speakers is often quite different. I am speaking here of the problems I see in what I take to be
typical SoTL work as it is enacted in the concurrent sessions.
2. Digiovanna actually uses other methods in other parts of the article, but the argument and method he
uses in section III, “Adding Understanding to the Concept,” is a particularly helpful example of the use of
armchair methods to offer important insights for SoTL.
3. I would like to thank Morgan Thompson, a central figure in the study of the inclusion of women and non-
white persons into philosophy, for helping to shape my thinking here.
4. Arendt’s argument is about the application of general moral principles, though her argument holds
equally well for general pedagogical principles.
5. For an updated analysis of this same problem, see Bloch-Schulman, 2012.
6. Here, I use “philosophers” to mean: professional philosophers, with Ph.D. in hand. Though I do not doubt
that there are philosophers who do not have these specific qualifications, this is a fast way to distinguish
a group of people who are societally and disciplinarily understood to be experts in the field. This
qualification thus is sufficient, even if not necessary, for the application.
7. An essentially contested concept are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless
disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users,” Gallie, 1955-1956, 169.
8. Before asking anyone to do a think aloud, I gave them explicit instructions about what a think aloud is
and how to do it; because it can be quite awkward, I also had everyone do a practice think aloud on a
mysterious object, during which I made suggestions or offered reminders about how to make sure as
much as possible is verbalized. During the think alouds themselves, I tried to be as unintrusive as
possible, mainly staying quiet, occasionally reminding a participant who had remained silent too long to
verbalize what she was thinking.
9. All of the think alouds have gone through IRB approval, and I have received consent from the
participants to use their real names.
10. On the way faculty problematize, see also Graff, 2002.
11. Here, the argument from Digiovanna, described above, becomes particularly relevant and important.
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